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Abstract
How does democracy relate to the initial economic policy responses to
Covid-19? Using a cross-country analysis, we find that countries with a
higher degree of democracy have stronger economic policy responses than
their peers. However, when we separate monetary and financial policies
from fiscal policy, democracy is not associated with the latter when we con-
trol for the income level of a country. Finally, for countries with lower levels
of labor participation, high levels of income inequality are associated with
weaker policy responses.
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1 Introduction
The initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic in most countries has been a
combination of lockdown and social distancing (Chudik et al., 2020; Toxvaer,
2020). Empirical evidence for the 1918 pandemic episode not only favors this
approach from a health policy perspective, but it also seems to be the best re-
sponse from an economic viewpoint (Correia et al., 1918). Due to the negative
externalities from the virus associated with the consumption of (social-intensive)
goods and services, an initial strong response with a progressive phase-out ac-
commodates health system capability, contains the contagion and diminishes the
negative impact on the economy (Eichenbaum et al., 2020).
The virus can be analyzed as a negative supply shock that generates a follow-
up negative demand shock (Guerrieri et al., 2020). This double effect imposes
an additional hurdle to policymakers and economic advisors, with no one-size-
fits-all solution. First, different countries have distinct fiscal spaces and mon-
etary architectures to respond to expected economic recession induced by this
pandemic. Second, the designed polices need to take into account the exist-
ing heterogeneity within countries as there seems to be an association between
the activities that were totally shut down (due to their inability of performing
delivery services or implementing tele-working polices, for instance) and the
vulnerability of workers within these sectors (Kaplan et al., 2020).
The roles of monetary and fiscal policies are different from the usual business-
cycle smoothing. On the one hand, monetary policy is already close to (or at)
the lower bound for most countries, and even in those with space to cut inter-
est rates, its effectiveness is rather low. On the other hand, while the lack of
monetary response should increase the fiscal multiplier (DeLong et al., 2012),
the usual circular-income-flow reasoning does not apply when most sectors in
the economy are closed (Guerrieri et al., 2020).1
1The heterogeneity in policy responses is synthesized in Elgin et al. (2020).
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Against this background, it seems crucial to understand what factors might
affect the size and type of policies that are currently being undertaken by gov-
ernments and policymakers to smooth the negative economic shock linked with
the virus. To the best of our knowledge, we develop the first cross-section anal-
ysis to understand the relationship between democracy and the responsiveness
of the economic policies undertaken for 152 countries. The main results suggest
that countries with a higher degree of democracy have stronger economic policy
responses than their peers. However, when we separate monetary and financial
policies from fiscal policy, democracy is not associated with the latter when we
control for the income level of a country. Additionally, for countries with lower
levels of labor participation, high levels of income inequality are associated with
weaker policy responses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the data and provides some stylized facts regarding policy responses between
regions and democracy levels, as well as the association with inequality and per
capita GDP. Section 3 presents our econometric results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Data sources
We gathered data on economic policy responses from the COVID-19 Economic
Stimulus Index (CESI) developed by Elgin et al. (2020). Information on democ-
racy levels was retrieved from The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy in-
dex. To control for the level of income and the size of government, we gathered
data on GDP per capita (GDPpc) and government share over GDPpc (GOV) from
Feenstra et al. (2015). 2 To control for labor market dynamics, we calculate a
proxy for labor market participation (PART) as a fraction between total employ-
ment and total population (data retrieved from Feenstra et al. (2015)). Finally,
2Both variables are adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP).
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we gathered information on the Gini coefficient (GINI) from Solt (2019). Table 1
reports descriptive summary statistics of all economic variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
CESI 152 0.06 1.31 −4.25 −0.57 0.58 4.85
Democracy 152 55.98 21.71 14.90 36.27 72.53 98.70
GDPpc 152 19.68 19.90 0.73 4.36 28.92 100.06
GINI 79 35.66 7.76 23.40 29.45 40.80 64.90
GOV 152 18.47 7.53 2.20 13.96 21.74 57.79
PART 152 0.43 0.10 0.19 0.37 0.49 0.87
GDPpc: Expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in mil. 2011US$); GOV and PART in
percentage points.
Figure 1: Democracy and CESI - Full Sample
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index, 2018
values; CESI from Elgin et al. (2020).
The association between democracy and economic policy responses seems
positive but not constant amongst regions. Using World Bank’s regions defini-
tion, while there is a positive association for Europe and Central Asia, East Asia
and Pacific, and South Asia (although less pronounced), there seems to be no
correlation for the remaining regions (Figure 2).3
3Since for North America the sample size is rather small (only three countries), we dropped
the associated scatterplot. Notwithstanding, the association is positive.
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Figure 2: Democracy and CESI by region
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index, 2018
values; CESI from Elgin et al. (2020). World Bank’s classification in
2020.
Since low-income countries and emerging market economies may be (more)
constrained to implement economic policy responses, especially in the fiscal
front, and high levels of inequality may limit the ability to accommodate lock-
down strategies, we would expect both variables to have a strong association
with the CESI. Figure 3 confirms this scenario, as countries with higher levels
of per capita GDPpc and lower levels on income inequality present stronger re-
sponses. Finally, while there seems to be a negative relationship between the
size of a government and the CESI, countries with higher levels of employment
share seem to be reacting more strongly to this pandemic, suggesting that the
size of the policy response may be influenced by the potential number of workers
exposed to the economic shock (Figure 4).
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Figure 3: CESI, (GDPpc) and inequality
Source: (GDPpc) (PPP adjusted) from Feenstra et al. (2015), 2017
values; CESI from Elgin et al. (2020); Inequality from Solt (2019),
2017 values.
Figure 4: CESI, government share (% GDP) and employment participation
Source: Government share (% GDP) and employment participation
from Feenstra et al. (2015), 2017 values; CESI from Elgin et al. (2020).
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3 Methodology and results
Following Correia (2016) and Guimaraes and Portugal (2010), we develop a
cross-country analysis to examine the impact of democracy on the initial eco-
nomic policy responses to Covid-19 until April 2020:
Yi = β jXji + µr + εi (1)
where Yi corresponds to the dependent variable, Xj is a vector of independent
variables, µr corresponds to a region fixed-effect term which takes into account
specific differences across the seven geographical regions, and εi is the error term
for the ith observation. Subscripts j and i denotes the independent variable j and
country i, respectively. Equation (1) is estimated for three dependent variables:
CESI;MacroFin, representing monetary, credit and macroprudential policies; and
the Fiscal policy variable.4
Table 2 summarizes the results for the relationship between CESI and the
explanatory variables. For all the considered cases, a higher democracy index
contributes consistently and positively to a stronger policy response from gov-
ernments. As Democracy, labor participation rate (PART) seems positively related
to the size of the policy (see columns (2)-(4)). This can be interpreted as follows:
countries seem to react more strongly when they have a higher level of labor
participation because more protection is needed to those that might suffer the
most with the Covid-19, i.e., the workers.
GDPpc also contributes positively to the policy response, in line with Elgin
et al. (2020), implying that richer countries will spend relatively more. GOV, on
the other hand, is not statistically significant across all models and, therefore, it
does not contribute to explain the size of the policy measures currently being
undertaken. Interestingly, the impact of income inequality seems to be intrinsi-
4See Elgin et al. (2020) for a full description of the variables.
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cally related with the labor participation in the country (see column (5)): for low
(high) levels of labor participation, an increase in inequality leads to a decrease
(increase) in policy response. This means that countries seem only to take into
account the level of inequality if the labor participation is sufficiently high. On
the other hand, countries with lower labor participation might be able to do bet-
ter, as it seems they are not taking into account inequality as a decision variable.
This is particularly relevant as overall inequality might tend to increase in the
medium and long run, as demonstrated by previous pandemic episodes (Furceri
et al., 2020).5
Table 2: COVID-19 Economic Stimulus Index (CESI)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.009* 0.010* 0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
PART 0.045*** 0.020* 0.021* -0.097
(1.072) (1.193) (1.214) (6.888)
GDPpc 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.023**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
GOV -0.021 -0.002
(0.013) (0.022)
GINI -0.123*
(0.064)
PART × GINI 0.284*
(0.166)
Observations 152 152 152 152 79
R-squared 0.335 0.425 0.483 0.494 0.577
Dependent variable: CESI. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3 presents the results for MacroFin. Once again, for all the cases a
higher democracy index contributes systematically and positively to a stronger
monetary response. A similar positive impact is also found for the labor partici-
pation rate. This suggests that central banks are directing their policies towards
5We also included the infection rate as a dependent variable to control for how strong a
country has been affected by the pandemic. Nevertheless, due to its statistical non-significance
across all estimations, it was not included in the final version of the paper.
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workers by easing the access to credit to commercial banks, which, in turn, will
support firms throughout the recovery. Interestingly, although GDPpc seems not
to be correlated with the policy response, the size of the government appears to
be negatively related with it. This result points towards the complementarity be-
tween fiscal and monetary policy: larger governments would have more leeway
to increase their fiscal policy and, therefore, would not need to rely as much on
monetary policy.
This can be also seen in Table 4, where a higher GDPpc contributes positively
to a stronger fiscal policy. In this regard, democracy loses its statistically signifi-
cance once we control GDP levels, suggesting that fiscal-policy responses do not
depend on the level of democracy but only on the level of income.6
Table 3: Macro-financial initial policy responses to Covid-19
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy 0.050*** 0.042** 0.036* 0.037*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
PART 0.045*** 0.020* 0.021*
(5.781) (5.921) (5.949)
GDPpc 0.016 0.009
(0.026) (0.026)
GOV -0.049*
(0.028)
Observations 152 152 152 152
R-squared 0.218 0.277 0.279 0.286
Dependent variable: MacroFin. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6Taking into account that the variables MacroFin and Fiscal are mainly composed by 0 and
1, and that we only have information on the Gini coefficient for 79 countries, we do not report
the results on the interaction between PART and GINI. Nonetheless, the impact of democracy on
MacroFin (Fiscal) is still positive and statistically significant (insignificant).
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Table 4: Fiscal policy initial responses to Covid-19
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.018 0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
PART 0.115*** 0.017 0.017
(3.913) (2.743) (2.759)
GDPpc 0.109*** 0.107***
(0.020) (0.020)
GOV -0.015
(0.023)
Observations 152 152 152 152
R-squared 0.282 0.355 0.469 0.470
Dependent variable: Fiscal. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results regarding the fiscal policy response to Covid-19 may be due to
another constraint: the monetary regime. In Figure 5 we can see how different
frameworks according to Cobham (2019) relate to the policy index from Elgin
et al. (2020). Countries under an augmented exchange rate fix have the highest
median level of CESI, while the lower group median (which also has a low
dipsersion) is associated with loose converging inflation targeting. The highest
dispersion is experienced under full exchange rate targeting.
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Figure 5: Monetary framework and policy index
Data for 83 countries in our regression using CESI from Elgin et al.
(2020) and monetary regimes from Cobham (2019):
ACB: Augmented currency board
AERF: Augmented exchange rate fix
CU: Currency union membership
FERT: Full exchange rate targeting
FIT: Full inflation targeting
LCIT: Loose converging inflation targeting
LIT: Loose inflation targeting
LSD: Loosely structured discretion
UASC: Use of another sovereign’s currency
UD: Unstructured discretion
WSD: Well structured discretion
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4 Concluding remarks
At the time we are writing this paper, countries around the world are designing
their policy plans to fight the inevitable economic consequences of the COVID-
19. By applying a cross-section analysis for 152 countries, we concluded that
countries with higher levels of democracy seem to be responding more aggres-
sively on the economic front. This may imply that more democratic countries
seem to better understand the long-term implications of this pandemic.
However, when we separate monetary and financial policies from fiscal pol-
icy, democracy is not associated with the latter when we control for the income
level of a country. This may be due to additional constraints such as the mone-
tary framework. Take the usual perfect capital mobility flow textbook model for
instance. Under a fixed exchange rate system, fiscal policy can have real impacts
on output.
This raises the question of why countries under some sort of exchange rate
control seem to have implemented a higher median level of economic policy
responses to Covid-19 and could be addressed in future works. Furthermore,
loose inflation targets are associated with the lowest group median among the
analyzed frameworks. This also raises questions regarding the designs of eco-
nomic institutions in response to pandemic episodes (and others) that could lead
to other avenues of research.
We also found that countries with higher labor participation rates seem to
react more strongly, as more protection is needed to workers and employees
because they are the ones who might suffer the most. Notwithstanding, for
countries with lower levels of labor participation, high levels of income inequal-
ity are associated with weaker policy responses, suggesting that those countries
might need to redesign their policies to ensure that these are effectively directed
to the ones in need.
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